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Security limitation on a class of device-independent quantum key distribution
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Recently there were many proposals on device-independent (DI) quantum key distribution proto-
col whose security is based on the violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality. However,
as a statistical law, a certain extent of fluctuation has to be allowed. We show that the eavesdropper
can make use of this property to obtain a remarkable part of the secret key by replacing some of
the DI nonlocal boxes with local ones. On the contrary, the same cheating strategy does not apply
to the device-dependent (DD) version of the protocol. Thus such kind of DI protocol is less secure
than its DD counterpart.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography has
caught great interests recently [1–10]. It aims to replace
the model of the physical devices used in the crypto-
graphic protocol with physically testable assumptions,
e.g., the certification of nonlocality. Thus the devices
can be treated as black boxes that produce outputs cor-
related with some inputs. This brings the advantage that
the assumptions needed to guarantee the security of the
protocol can be significantly reduced, so that the knowl-
edge of the internal workings of the devices is not re-
quired. The protocol remains reliable even if the devices
are provided by the adversary. Such a higher degree of
security makes DI protocols more dependable in practical
applications than traditional quantum cryptography.
In many recent proposals on DI quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) protocol [11–17], the nonlocality is tested by
observing the violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) inequality. However, being a statistic law,
fluctuation deviated from the expected CHSH value is in-
evitable in principle, even if experimental imperfections
are not taken into account. Here we show that it leaves
rooms for the eavesdropper to use local boxes in place of
the DI boxes with a certain frequency, so that he stands a
non-trivial probability to learn a part of the raw key while
escaping the detection. On the other hand, we will also
show that the device-dependent (DD) version of the same
protocol is completely immune to this specific cheating
strategy. This result indicates that such a DI QKD pro-
tocol is less secure than its own device-dependent (DD)
version.
We will see that this security limitation is a fundamen-
tal theoretical problem of DI QKD, which is not caused
by the imperfections of experimental devices. Therefore
for simplicity, such imperfections will not be considered
here. That is, we only study the ideal case without trans-
mission errors, detection loss, or dark counts, etc.
In order to make it easier to understand the DI QKD
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protocol based on the CHSH inequality, we will first de-
scribe its DD version in the next section. Then we give
the DI one in section III. In section IV we will explain
which kind of statistical fluctuation is considered in this
paper. The cheating strategy on DI QKD will be elabo-
rated in section V, and it will be shown in section VI why
the strategy does not work in the DD protocol. Finally,
we summarize our result in section VII.
II. THE DD QKD PROTOCOL
Following the notations of [12, 13], a particular DD im-
plementation of the QKD protocols based on the CHSH
inequality can be accomplished in the following manner.
Alice and Bob share a quantum channel consisting of a
source that supplies many pairs of entangled particles,
each of which is supposed to be in the Bell state
∣
∣Φ+
〉
= (|0〉A |0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B)/
√
2, (1)
where particle A (B) goes to Alice (Bob), with |0〉 and
|1〉 denoting the two eigenstates of the Pauli operator σz .
On each of their particles, Alice chooses randomly among
three measurements
A0 = σz,
A1 = (σz + σx)/
√
2,
A2 = (σz − σx)/
√
2, (2)
while Bob chooses randomly between two measurements
B1 = σz ,
B2 = σx. (3)
The outcomes of the measurements are labeled as ai, bj ∈
{+1,−1} (i = 0, 1, 2, j = 1, 2). Alice and Bob an-
nounce their inputs (i.e., their choices of the measure-
ments) through a classical channel, which can be inse-
cure. To check whether the states indeed have the form
of Eq. (1), they gather the outcomes when Alice did not
choose A0, and compute the CHSH polynomial
S = 〈a1b1〉+ 〈a1b2〉+ 〈a2b1〉 − 〈a2b2〉 , (4)
2where the correlator 〈aibj〉 is defined as the probabil-
ity P (a = b|ij) − P (a 6= b|ij). To generate a raw se-
cret key, they use the outcomes when Alice chose A0
and Bob chose B1. When no eavesdropping present,
there should always be a0 = b1, while the CHSH value
reaches the point of maximal quantum violation of the
well-known CHSH Bell inequality, i.e., the correlators
satisfy 〈a1b1〉 = 〈a1b2〉 = 〈a2b1〉 = −〈a2b2〉 = 1/
√
2 so
that S = 2
√
2.
III. THE DI QKD PROTOCOL
In brief, the typical structure of the DI version of the
above QKD protocol is as follows. Alice and Bob share
many pairs of devices called nonlocal boxes, which can be
supplied by either Alice or Bob, or even an untrusty third
party, including the eavesdropper Eve. These devices
can be treated as DI black boxes that take inputs and
produce outputs, without the need nor the possibility to
check how they work internally. Each of Alice’s (Bob’s)
boxes has three (two) inputs A0, A1 and A2 (B1 and B2).
For each input, Alice’s (Bob’s) box can product either of
the two outputs ai = ±1 (bj = ±1). When no cheating
present, i.e., the boxes are manufactured honestly and
working properly, Alice’s and Bob’s inputs to each pair
of their boxes should display the maximal nonlocality, as
can be checked by the CHSH value in Eq. (4).
In the protocol, Alice and Bob choose their inputs
into the boxes randomly, and then announce the inputs
through a classical channel. Whenever Alice chooses A0
and Bob chooses B1 for the boxes in the same pair, the
outputs should satisfy a0 = b1 so that they can use these
pairs to generate a raw secret key. For other boxes, they
gather the outcomes and calculate the CHSH value to
detect the existence of eavesdropping. See [11, 13, 14]
for other details of the protocols.
IV. STATISTICAL FLUCTUATIONS
It is worth noting that the maximal CHSH value
S = 2
√
2 is a statistical result, calculated from the mean
values 〈aibj〉 (i, j = 1, 2) of finite outcomes. Since any
statistical property is inevitably subjected to fluctuation
even in the ideal case, we cannot expect to find the actual
result of an experiment exactly equal to the theoretical
value.
As a simple example, let us consider the outcomes of
tossing a classical coin. Suppose that the coin is abso-
lutely ideal, that the outcomes “heads” and “tails” will
both occur with the probability 1/2 without any bias at
all. Even so, tossing the coin twice does not necessar-
ily result in 1 head and 1 tail. In fact this result will
occur with the probability 50% only. In the rest 50%
case, the ratio of heads to tails will be either 2 : 0 or
0 : 2. When tossing the coin n times, we cannot expect
that the ratio will be perfectly n/2 : n/2 either. In fact,
interestingly, this perfect result will occur with the prob-
ability
(
n/2
n
)
/2n only, which drops as n increases. That
is, the more samples involved in the statistics, the less we
can expect to meet the theoretical value exactly. More
importantly, as we mentioned, this is the result for an
ideal coin. It remains valid even if we do not consider
any experimental imperfection, e.g., biased coins, wind
disturbance, etc. Therefore, in practice we have to ac-
cept a certain range of fluctuation deviating from the
perfect result that we expect theoretically. For instance,
when tossing the ideal coin for 10000 times, it is still ac-
ceptable if the ratio between heads and tails turns out
to be 5500 : 4500, as this result can indeed occur with a
probability not much less than that of the perfect result
5000 : 5000.
For the same reason, when checking the CHSH value in
the DI QKD protocol, we can hardly expect to find S =
2
√
2 even if all parties are completely honest. Even the
actual value turns out to be a little lower, the secret key
should still be considered secure. Otherwise the protocol
will have only little probability to proceed, even when
no eavesdropping present at all. Indeed, some papers
suggested a precise acceptable lower bound for the CHSH
value. For example, S ≥ 2.5 is considered acceptable in
step 5 of the protocol in [17].
Note that the origin of this problem is not the channel
noise studied in [11, 16], whose effect is, e.g., following
the notation in [11], to transform the state Eq. (1) into
the Werner state with the density matrix
ρ = p
∣
∣Φ+
〉 〈
Φ+
∣
∣+ (1− p)I
4
, (5)
so that the expected CHSH value S will drop. Instead,
the fluctuation considered here is a fundamental theoret-
ical property of statistical quantities, which exists even
when the probability p in the above equation vanishes.
V. SECURITY PROBLEMS
As S < 2
√
2 has to be accepted in practice, there is
more room for eavesdropping in such a DI QKD protocol,
as elaborated below.
Consider that the eavesdropper Eve replaces the DI
nonlocal boxes with a local box pair X1, whose outcomes
have a fixed relationship as
X1 : a0 = a1 = a2 = b1 = b2, (6)
where a0 is chosen beforehand by Eve to be either +1 or
−1. That is, e.g., if a0 = +1, then Alice will obtain the
outcome a1 = +1 when her input to her box is A1, or she
will obtain the outcome a2 = +1 when her input is A2.
Meanwhile, Bob will obtain the outcome b1 = +1 when
his input to his box is B1, etc.
Such a local box pair can be constructed, because in
a DI protocol, Alice and Bob cannot assume that the
inputs Ai’s and Bj ’s must correspond to the operators
3in Eqs. (2) and (3). Instead, Eve can, e.g., prepares
Alice’s and Bob’s box pair in the product state |0〉A |0〉B
or |1〉A |1〉B, and let all inputs be the operator σz. Then
we can see that Eq. (6) can be met.
Similarly, there can be other local box pairs X2, X3
and X4, whose outcomes satisfy
X2 : a0 = a1 = −a2 = b1 = b2,
X3 : a0 = a1 = a2 = b1 = −b2,
X4 : a0 = −a1 = a2 = b1 = −b2, (7)
where a0 is also chosen beforehand by Eve. These box
pairs can be constructed using non-entangled product
states too. For example, X2 can be obtained by preparing
Alice’s and Bob’s box pair in the three-particle product
state |01〉A |0〉B, and the inputs are set as A0 = A1 =
σz ⊗ I, A2 = I ⊗ σz, and B1 = B2 = σz .
From Eq. (4) we can easily find that the CHSH value
for each of X1, X2, X3 and X4 is S = 2 as nonlocality
is absent between Alice’s and Bob’s boxes. Also, if Eve
uses equal numbers of each of the four box pairs, then
the correlators 〈a1b1〉, 〈a1b2〉, 〈a2b1〉, and −〈a2b2〉 in Eq.
(4) all equal to 2. Therefore no bias can be found even
if these correlators are checked separately. Now since
all the four box pairs satisfy a0 = b1, whenever Alice
and Bob chooses such a pair to generate the raw secret
key, Eve will know the corresponding secret bit, while
Alice’s and Bob’s keys remain consistent with each other
so that they find nothing wrong. The remaining question
is whether Eve can pass the CHSH value check.
Obviously, as X1, X2, X3 and X4 all have the CHSH
value S = 2 < 2
√
2, Eve cannot pass the check if she
replaced all nonlocal boxes with these four. However, as
we mentioned, in the DI QKD protocol a lower CHSH
value has to be allowed due to the existence of statistical
fluctuations. Therefore if Eve uses the local boxes for a
small portion, then she will have a non-trivial probability
to pass the check, while manage to learn a part of the
secret key. It turns out that the amount of the key she
learned is not too small, as we will show below.
Let Smin denote the lower bound of the CHSH value
allowed in the DI QKD protocol, and Sn = 2
√
2 be the
CHSH value expected theoretically for the boxes display-
ing maximal nonlocality. Suppose that Eve replaces the
nonlocal boxes using the above local ones with the prob-
ability p. As the local boxes have the CHSH value S = 2,
while the rest nonlocal ones that Eve has not replaced are
expected to give Sn = 2
√
2 averagely, the final expected
value Se that Alice and Bob will find in their CHSH value
check is
Se = 2p+ Sn(1− p). (8)
When Se ≥ Smin Eve can pass the check successfully. In
this case
p ≤ Sn − Smin
Sn − 2 . (9)
This sets the maximal probability that Eve can use the
local boxes to cheat. Since Eve will know the secret bit
once a local box pair is chosen to generate the raw key,
p also describes the proportion of the raw key leaked to
Eve. Substituting Smin = 2.5 (as suggested in [17]) and
Sn = 2
√
2 into Eq. (9), we have p ≤ 39.64%. As Eve
should use each of the four local boxesX1, X2,X3 andX4
with equal probabilities, this result means that she can
use each box with the probability 9.9%, and learn 39.6%
of the raw secret key, which is far from being trivial.
Note that for the rest 1 − p = 60.4% nonlocal boxes
that Eve has not replaced, fluctuation also exists when
calculating the CHSH value. Therefore Eve cannot guar-
antee that the actual CHSH value Sa obtained in her
above cheating will always satisfy Sa > Smin. But on
one hand, the fluctuation can either raise or lower the
actual value. Even if there is only about 1/2 probability
that Eve manages to learn 39.6% of the raw secret key
without being detected, it is still a serious problem to
the DI QKD protocol. On the other hand, when the lo-
cal boxes X1, X2, X3 and X4 take part in the calculation
of the CHSH value, no fluctuation will take place as the
outcomes of these boxes are deterministic. The average
fluctuation range caused by the rest 60.4% nonlocal boxes
is surely smaller than that in the honest protocol where
100% of the boxes are nonlocal. If Eve uses the local
boxes with a slightly lower probability p, she can further
raise the expected CHSH value Se so that there is even
less chances that the fluctuation caused by the rest non-
local boxes is sufficiently large to bring the actual value
Sa down below Smin.
VI. COMPARING WITH THE DD PROTOCOL
Intriguingly, Eve’s above cheating strategy is com-
pletely futile in the DD protocol. This is because in the
DD scenario, Alice and Bob always know what are the
exact measurements that correspond to their inputs to
the states, as shown in section II. Eve has no chance
to change the measurements, even if she can replace the
states. When applying the above cheating strategy, the
states she uses must be able to give a deterministic result
when Alice and Bob choose them to generate the secret
key. Therefore, the states have to be the eigenstates of
Alice’s measurement A0 and Bob’s B1. As A0 = B1 = σz
are fixed in the DD protocol, the states must be either
|0〉A |0〉B or |1〉A |1〉B.
Now we calculate the CHSH values of |0〉A |0〉B and|1〉A |1〉B using Eq. (4). But we can no longer set all
inputs as the operator σz as we did in the DI case. In-
stead, the operators have to remain the forms in Eqs.
(2) and (3). Consequently, we will find S =
√
2 <
2. But more importantly, the correlators in S will be
〈a1b1〉 = 〈a2b1〉 = 1/
√
2 while 〈a1b2〉 = 〈a2b2〉 = 0.
On the contrary, when the state |Φ+〉 was used honestly,
there should be 〈a1b1〉 = 〈a1b2〉 = 〈a2b1〉 = −〈a2b2〉 =
1/
√
2. Therefore, even if Eve mixes the states |0〉A |0〉B
and |1〉A |1〉B with |Φ+〉, then as long as |0〉A |0〉B and
|1〉A |1〉B present with a non-trivial probability p, Alice
4and Bob will be able to find a bias on the values of the
correlators. That is, Eve cannot escape the detection if
she want to learn a non-trivial portion of the raw secret
key.
VII. SUMMARY AND REMARKS
Thus we can see that in the DI QKD protocol based
on the violation of CHSH inequality, a lower CHSH value
has to be allowed due to the existence of statistical fluc-
tuation. Then the eavesdropper can have a non-trivial
probability to learn a remarkable amount of information
on the raw secret key without being detected. Note once
again that this fluctuation exists even in the ideal case. It
is a fundamental theoretical problem of statistical prop-
erties, which is not caused by any experimental imperfec-
tion. Even if entangled states can be perfectly prepared
and we can get rid of the disturbance from the environ-
ment noise, the fluctuation will still remain. Therefore,
unfortunately, this security problem cannot be avoided
by improving the experimental technology.
Of course, by increasing the total number n of the DI
boxes used in the protocol, the relative deviation from
the theoretical expected value caused by the fluctuation
will decrease, so that Alice and Bob can choose a higher
Smin value. Therefore it will lower the ratio p between the
number of Eve’s obtained bits and the entire raw secret
key (even though the absolute number of bits that Eve
obtained will still rise). Thus the DI QKD protocol is still
secure in the limit n → ∞. However, as showed in the
previous section, the DD protocol is completely immune
to the same cheating strategy of Eve, without requiring
an infinite n. So we can see that quantitatively speaking,
for any given finite n, the current DI QKD protocol is
not as secure as its DD counterpart.
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